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Abstract
Ideal grasping movements should maintain an appropriate probability of success, while controlling movement-related costs, in 
the presence of varying visual (and motor) uncertainty. It is often assumed that the probability of errors is managed by adjust-
ing a margin for error in hand opening (e.g., opening the hand wider with increased visual uncertainty). This idea is intuitive, 
but non-trivial. It implies not only that the brain can estimate the amount of uncertainty, but also that it can compute how 
different possible alterations to the movement will affect the probability of errors—which we term the ‘probability landscape’. 
Previous work suggests the amount of uncertainty is factored into grasping movements. Our aim was to determine whether 
grasping movements are also sensitive to the probability landscape. Subjects completed three different grasping tasks, with 
naturally different probability landscapes, such that appropriate margin-for-error responses to increased uncertainty were 
qualitatively different (opening the hand wider, the same amount, or less wide). We increased visual uncertainty by blurring 
vision, and by covering one eye. Movements were performed without visual feedback to isolate uncertainty in the brain’s 
initial estimate of object properties. Changes to hand opening in response to increased visual uncertainty closely resembled 
those predicted by the margin-for-error account, suggesting that grasping is sensitive to the probability landscape associated 
with different tasks. Our findings therefore support the intuitive idea that grasping movements employ a true margin-for-error 
mechanism, which exerts active control over the probability of errors across changing circumstances.
Keywords Grasping · Visuo-motor control · Visual uncertainty · Margin for error · Grip aperture
Introduction
The elegant efficiency of natural grasping movements is 
evident in how the posture of the hand is shaped ‘in-flight’ 
to anticipate the properties of target objects (Jeannerod 
1984, 1988; Marteniuk et al. 1990). This hand pre-shaping 
is often thought to include a margin for error, designed to 
prevent mistakes such as knocking into objects, or failing to 
grasp them altogether, in face of visual (and motor) noise 
(Jakobson and Goodale 1991; Winges et al. 2003; Schli-
cht and Schrater 2007a; Christopolous and; Schrater 2009; 
Takemura et al. 2015). The idea that the grasping system 
responds adaptively to visual uncertainty emerges from 
the observation that increased uncertainty typically results 
in wider opening of the hand (Wing et al. 1986; Jakobson 
and Goodale 1991; Schlicht and Schrater 2007a). At face 
value, this behaviour resembles a “strategy” of erring on the 
side of caution, acting to mitigate the otherwise increased 
probability of error (Hibbard and Bradshaw 2003; Melmoth 
and Grant 2006). Although the margin-for-error account is 
intuitive, it implies non-trivial underlying processes. Spe-
cifically, it suggests that the probability of grasping errors 
is actively controlled, presumably to some criterion level, 
over varying conditions. We argue that this requires not only 
access to the precise amount of visual uncertainty, but also 
knowledge of how different possible movements increase 
or decrease the probability of errors. We refer to the lat-
ter as the ‘probability landscape’ associated with the task. 
Evidence that the precise magnitude of visual uncertainty 
is factored into grasp programmes comes from the finding 
that there is a systematic relationship between the degree of 
visual uncertainty and grasp opening (Schlicht and Schrater 
2007a). In this experiment we consider whether grasp pro-
gramming also factors in the probability landscape. Specifi-
cally, we explored whether the responses to increased visual 
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uncertainty were appropriate across tasks with qualitatively 
different probability landscapes. We reasoned that such sen-
sitivity would provide compelling evidence for active control 
of the probability of errors, as the margin-for-error account 
implies.
Movements such as grasping can be characterised as opti-
misation problems, over a wide range of variables (e.g. Flash 
and Hogan 1985; Harris and Wolpert 1998; Todorov and 
Jordan 2002). An ideal movement has a high probability of 
success, while managing other costs such as energy expendi-
ture, movement time, comfort etc. The value of success and 
failure also matters. Knocking over a wooden block in a 
visuo-motor control laboratory has different consequences 
than spilling hot coffee on one’s hand, for instance, and it 
can be worth expending greater energy for greater ‘reward’ 
(Shadmehr et al. 2016). The process of determining how 
grasping can best be achieved in a given situation can there-
fore be construed as minimising an overall cost function 
that considers intrinsic movement costs, the probability of 
different outcomes, and the value of those outcomes (Trom-
mershäuser et al. 2008; Todorov and Jordan 2002; Wolpert 
and Landy 2012). A fundamental premise is that this process 
is subject to noise (uncertainty), rendering it probabilistic in 
nature (Trommershäuser et al. 2008). At the ‘front end’, vis-
ual estimates of object and scene properties, and feedback, 
are subject to noise. Noise is presumably also introduced at 
various intermediate neural processing stages, such as co-
ordinate transformations. Then motor noise contributes to 
variability in motor output per se (Trommershäuser et al. 
2003; Schlicht and Schrater 2007b; Takemura et al. 2015).
As noted above, one source of noise is the brain’s esti-
mates of the spatial properties of the object to be grasped. 
Grasp kinematics reveal that object size, location, etc. are 
estimated from vision prior to movement onset, allowing 
the grasping hand to be pre-shaped so as to anticipate the 
final posture required (Jeannerod 1984, 1988; Marteniuk 
et al. 1990; Jakobson and Goodale 1991). Hand opening, for 
instance, reaches a clearly identifiable peak (maximum grip 
aperture) partway through the movement, which, although 
wider than the object, varies highly reliably as a function of 
object size. Estimates of object properties are necessarily 
noisy, however, and the amount of noise or uncertainty is not 
fixed, but varies substantially, even in normal viewing. For 
example, geometrical factors such as the distance and orien-
tation of object surfaces, their visible texture, and content of 
the surrounding scene all result in variations in uncertainty 
(e.g., Gepshtein and Banks 2003; Knill and Saunders 2003; 
Hillis et al. 2004; Keefe et al. 2011). An ideal movement pro-
gramme should take account of these changes because they 
have implications for the probability of success. Consider 
the effects of increased visual uncertainty. This increases 
the range of possible locations of a target object’s surfaces 
(Schlicht and Schrater 2007a), corresponding to an increased 
range of possible sizes/positions the object could have. Thus, 
if increased uncertainty simply propagates to more variable 
movement programmes, the probability of failing to enclose 
the object with the hand increases, and so the probability of 
errors (here, the digits colliding with the object) increases.
According to the margin-for-error account, the grasp-
ing system mitigates this increased probability of errors by 
adjusting the bias in the programmed hand opening. In the 
above example it is intuitive that increasing hand opening 
will reduce the probability of errors: the grasp cannot be 
opened too wide to enclose the object, but can be opened 
not-wide-enough [see Christopolous and Schrater (2009), 
for a more complex case]. Yet, the underlying computations 
required to achieve precise control over the probability 
of errors (as opposed to a simple heuristic response) are 
non-trivial. Two related pieces of information are required. 
First, the magnitude of uncertainty in the estimate of object 
properties must be known precisely (i.e., the probability dis-
tribution describing the range of possible locations of the 
object’s surfaces). Second, the system must know how dif-
ferent possible movements affect the probability of success 
or failure, which we refer to as the probability landscape 
associated with the task. As noted above, for normal grasp-
ing movements the probability landscape is asymmetrical 
with respect to hand opening, in that increasing it decreases 
the chance of errors and vice versa, but other tasks have 
different probability landscapes associated with them. In 
principle, combining these two pieces of information can 
then yield the required alteration to grasp opening to control 
the probability of errors to the desired level, given current 
circumstances.
Definitive evidence that the grasping system is sensitive 
to the first of these pieces of information—the degree of 
visual uncertainty—is (surprisingly) sparse. Many studies 
have manipulated the ‘quality’ of visual information avail-
able. However, because these studies typically employed 
binary manipulations, comparing normal vs. degraded 
vision (binocular vs. monocular vision, for example), it is 
not possible to determine unambiguously whether changes 
to grip apertures reflected sensitivity to the precise magni-
tude of visual uncertainty, or a kind of heuristic strategy, or 
‘ballpark’ response (e.g. Servos et al. 1992; Jackson et al. 
1997; Watt and Bradshaw 2000; Loftus et al. 2004; Mel-
moth and Grant 2006; Keefe et al. 2011). One exception 
is a study by Schlicht and Schrater (2007a), who manipu-
lated visual uncertainty more parametrically, by varying the 
retinal eccentricity of the object and moving hand (subjects 
fixated an eccentric ‘target’ positioned at 0°–80° eccentric-
ity, in 10° steps). They found a highly reliable relationship 
between visual eccentricity and hand opening, with increas-
ingly eccentric (increasingly uncertain) visual information 
resulting in systematically larger grip apertures, demonstrat-
ing sensitivity to the amount of visual uncertainty.
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In this experiment we examined whether grasp pre-shap-
ing is sensitive to the other component of the margin-for-
error account: the probability landscape associated with 
the task. The above studies examined similar movements 
(precision grasping, in which the index finger and thumb 
close onto the outer surfaces of a simple object) for which 
the appropriate response to increased uncertainty was quali-
tatively the same (increased grasp opening). We exploited 
naturally occurring changes in the qualitative shape of the 
probability landscape that result from different tasks. The 
three tasks used in our experiment are explored in Fig. 1. 
The left column (Fig. 1a) depicts the normal probability 
condition, in which subjects grasped in the normal manner, 
closing the finger and thumb on the outer surfaces of the 
objects. Here the probability landscape is asymmetrical 
with respect to grip aperture, as described above. All else 
being equal, the wider the hand is opened the lower the 
probability of failing to grasp the object, so the probabil-
ity of errors falls monotonically as the programmed grasp 
opening increases (solid line in the bottom panel). As visual 
uncertainty increases, the range of possible locations of the 
object surfaces increases (pink shaded zones in the mid-
dle and bottom panels). Now, for the same hand opening, 
the probability of errors increases because the object will 
fall outside the hand opening on a greater proportion of 
occasions (dashed line in the bottom panel). The criterion 












































Fig. 1  The three tasks and associated probability-landscape condi-
tions. a The normal probability condition. b The equal probability 
condition. c The reverse probability condition. The top row shows 
each object type being grasped. Rubber thimbles worn on the fin-
ger and thumb, and the motion capture markers, are also visible (see 
“Methods”). The middle row depicts increased visual uncertainty in 
cartoon form. The images show side views of objects in each condi-
tion. The arrows below the objects indicate the how we defined object 
size in each case (in the equal condition, object size = inner size). The 
arrows pointing at the object surfaces depict the direction of proto-
typical final movements of the digits onto the object surfaces. The 
shaded zones (pink, in colour versions) depict the range of possible 
locations of the objects’ surfaces, given an arbitrary amount of visual 
uncertainty (in reality this is continuous rather than discrete, reflect-
ing an underlying probability distribution). The bottom row depicts, 
schematically, hypothetical probabilities of grasping errors as a func-
tion of the programmed grasp opening for each task. For simplic-
ity, we depict uncertainty in terms of its effect on the singular value 
object size, but in reality it corresponds to uncertainty in the location 
of the object’s surfaces, and so can also be thought of as positional 
uncertainty. The vertical line(s) show an example object size, and the 
horizontal lines show an arbitrary criterion level for the probability of 
errors. The pink shaded zones show the increased range of possible 
sizes (locations of the object’s surfaces) with high uncertainty, as pre-
viously. The solid curves depict how the probability of errors varies 
with hand opening for low visual uncertainty (assuming some fixed 
level of motor noise). The dashed curves depict the same relationship 
for high visual uncertainty
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error level can be met, however, by programming a wider 
hand opening. Thus, the appropriate response to increased 
uncertainty is to increase grip apertures. The middle column 
(Fig. 1b) depicts the equal probability condition, in which 
subjects grasped objects by inserting the digits into two slots 
to grasp a central bar. Because it is possible to collide with 
both the inner and outer surfaces of the slots, opening the 
hand wider or less wide will result in approximately equal 
increases in the probability of colliding with the upper sur-
face of the object (the probability landscape is symmetrical 
with respect to hand opening). In this case, increased uncer-
tainty results in a narrower ‘zone’ into which the digits must 
be inserted to achieve the criterion error level, and changing 
the bias of the programmed grasp opening therefore does not 
provide effective control over the probability of errors. Thus, 
the margin-for-error account predicts no change in grasp 
opening in this situation, because there is no adjustment to 
grip aperture that can mitigate the otherwise increased prob-
ability of errors. (Note, with sufficient uncertainty it may be 
impossible to achieve the criterion error level with any pro-
grammed grasp opening.) The right column (Fig. 1c) depicts 
the reverse probability condition, in which a u-shaped object 
was grasped by moving the digits outwards to touch its inner 
surfaces. Here, the converse pattern to normal grasping 
applies. Hand opening can be too large, but not too small, 
and so the probability landscape is again asymmetrical, but 
reversed with respect to normal grasping, and the criterion 
error level can be met by programming a smaller hand open-
ing. In this condition, sensitivity to the probability landscape 
would therefore be indicated by decreased grip apertures in 
response to increased uncertainty—the opposite of normal 
grasping. If, instead, the grasping system is insensitive to 
changes in the probability landscape, grip apertures would 
be expected either to increase in response to uncertainty 
in all three conditions, or for no clear pattern to emerge in 
the unusual situations of the equal and reverse conditions. 
We increased visual uncertainty in two different ways—by 
blurring vision, and by removing binocular information—
reasoning that this may provide converging evidence. In all 
conditions, we prevented vision of the target and hand fol-
lowing movement onset so that any effects were attribut-
able to changes in uncertainty in initial estimates of object 
properties used to plan movements (our experimental ques-
tion), and not to differences in the quality of visual feedback, 
which may have varied across the different tasks.
Methods
Subjects
Fourteen subjects took part in the experiment (13 right-
handed, one left-handed; 6 male, 8 female, aged 18–35 years 
old). All had normal or corrected to normal vision, includ-
ing normal binocular depth perception (stereoacuity better 
than 40 arcsec). None reported any motor deficits. Subjects 
gave informed consent and were paid for their participation. 
The procedures were approved by the Ethics Committee of 
the School of Psychology, Bangor University, and were in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus and stimuli
The three different grasping tasks, and object types, used to 
manipulate the probability landscape are shown in Fig. 1. 
Subjects were seated at a table, and positioned with their 
eyes ~ 400 mm above the table surface, directly above a start 
button aligned with their body midline. A chin rest was used 
to stabilise head position. In all conditions, subjects grasped 
objects using only the thumb and index finger of their pre-
ferred hand. In the normal and equal conditions subjects 
began each trial with these digits lightly pinched together, 
pressing the start button. In the reverse condition subjects 
began each movement with an open grasp, with the thumb 
pressing on the start button, and the index finger resting on 
a 10 × 10 mm pad 120 mm in front of the start button. Our 
intention was for the reverse condition to be an ‘inverted’ 
analogue of normal grasping, in which subjects first closed 
the hand to a size smaller than the object, and then opened 
it wider at the end of the movement to ‘grasp’ the object 
(see Fig. 2). The table surface was covered in matt black 
cardboard, and the scene was lit by normal fluorescent light-
ing. Vision of the scene was controlled using a Liquid Crys-
tal “smart glass” panel (PolyVisionTM, United Kingdom) 
positioned ~ 50 mm in front of subjects’ eyes. The state of 
the panel—transparent or opaque—was controlled by the 
experiment computer, and when opaque it occluded vision 
of the hand and stimuli.
Subjects wore rubber thimbles (diameter approximately 
15 mm) on the finger and thumb in all conditions (see 
Fig. 1). This was done to equate friction between the object 
surfaces and digits across the different tasks. Otherwise, in 
the reverse condition, the nails of the digits would have con-
tacted the object surfaces (as opposed to the pulpar surfaces 
in the other conditions), resulting in insufficient friction to 
easily grasp them, which may have affected the margin-for-
error response.
Each probability condition required a different set of 
target objects. Within each condition we used a large num-
ber of object sizes (seven). We also presented objects at 
pseudo-randomised distances (see below). This factor was 
not of experimental interest, but the combination of a large 
number of sizes and random distances was intended to 
minimise learning of object properties and/or the required 
movements, which has been shown to reduce the effects of 
degrading visual information (by providing another signal 
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to the required movement; Keefe and Watt 2009). The size 
of the objects varied along the dimension along which they 
were grasped (Fig. 1). In the normal task, the objects had 
front-to-back sizes of 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 mm. 
In the equal task, the sizes of the central blocks were 
the same as the sizes in the normal condition. The slots 
in which the digits were placed were 25 mm wide (and 
22 mm tall). In the reverse task the distances between the 
grasped surfaces were 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, and 100 mm. 
Object distances were generated by using six ‘base’ dis-
tances (200, 250, 300, 350, 400 and 450 mm from the 
start button), and then adding a random value between 0 
and 50 mm (in 5 mm increments) on each trial. This had 
the effect of distributing the distances used in each block 
throughout the range 200–500 mm, with a random ‘jitter’. 
The objects were presented on the table surface along the 
subjects’ body midline.
Grasping movements were recorded using a ProReflex 
infrared motion capture system (Qualisys AB, Sweden). The 
system captured the x, y, z positions of markers attached 
to the thumb and finger thimbles (visible in the top row in 
Fig. 1), at 240 Hz.
There were three viewing conditions: binocular viewing, 
blurred binocular viewing, and monocular viewing. In the 
binocular condition the scene was viewed normally, with 
both eyes, and so visual uncertainty was at a typical level. 
In the blurred binocular viewing condition the scene was 
viewed through a translucent plastic diffusing film (made 
from stage-lighting gel) attached to the smart-glass panel in 
front the eyes, which increased visual uncertainty by blur-
ring the scene. In the monocular viewing condition subjects 
wore an eye patch over their right eye, which increased vis-
ual uncertainty by eliminating binocular depth cues (ocular 
vergence and binocular disparity; Hillis et al. 2004; Keefe 
et al. 2011).
Procedure
With the exception of the different tasks (and starting pos-
ture for the reverse condition), the procedure was the same 
for all conditions. On each trial, the object was presented 
for 2 s followed by an audible beep, which was the signal 
to initiate the movement. In the normal and equal condi-
tions subjects were instructed to pick up the objects front to 
back using their thumb and index finger (grasping the central 
block in the case of the equal grasping condition; Fig. 1). 
In the reverse condition subjects were instructed to pick up 
the objects by pushing against their opposing inner surfaces 
using their thumb and index finger (Fig. 1). Releasing the 
start button extinguished the subjects’ view, so that grasps 
were performed without visual feedback. Reaches that were 
initiated before the start signal, or > 600 ms after it, were 
considered void (void trials were repeated at the end of the 
block, such that we obtained complete data sets that met the 
response criteria for all subjects in all conditions). The num-
ber of void trials was small overall, and did not vary system-
atically with viewing condition (see below). The experiment 
was a within-subjects design: all subjects completed all three 
tasks (normal, equal, and reverse) under all three viewing 
conditions (binocular, blurred binocular, and monocular). 
Trials were blocked by viewing condition and by grasping 
task (normal, equal, or reverse). Viewing condition was nec-
essarily blocked for practical reasons. Grasping task was 
blocked to give subjects the best opportunity to learn the 
novel probability landscapes, and to minimise the likeli-
hood of our study confounding appropriate margin-for-error 
(a) (b) (c)
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Fig. 2  Example grip aperture profiles for each task, from one subject. 
a 3-D distance between finger and thumb markers (grip aperture) as 
a function of time, in the normal condition. The three curves depict 
three individual trials, with binocular viewing, for movements to the 
smallest (solid line), middle-sized (dashed line), and largest (dot-
ted line) object. The circular symbols on each curve show the points 
identified as maximum grip aperture in each case. b, c Example grip 
aperture profiles for the equal and reverse conditions, in the same for-
mat as a (except minimum grip apertures are indicated in c)
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responses per se with difficulties switching rapidly between 
tasks/probability landscapes. A single block consisted of 
each object size presented at each object distance (plus jit-
ter), making 42 trials. Each block was repeated twice for 
each viewing condition/task. Subjects therefore completed 
84 trials within each viewing condition and task, and 756 
trials (18 blocks) in total. Within each block, trial order was 
randomised. The experiment was completed in two halves, 
each containing one block of each condition/task. Within 
each half, block order was randomised, with the constraint 
that the same task/probability-landscape condition was not 
completed on consecutive blocks. Each subject took around 
5 h to complete the experiment, split across several sessions 
(completed across several days). The median number of void 
trials per condition/task (84 valid trials) was 5, 7 and 5 in 
the normal, equal and reverse probability-landscape condi-
tions, respectively (we analysed medians because void-trial 
rates were bimodal rather than normally distributed: most 
subjects had consistently low rates, while a small number 
had consistently higher rates). Friedman tests showed that 
void-trial rate was not affected by viewing condition in any 
of the probability-landscape conditions (test statistic and 
p value for normal, equal and reverse conditions, respec-
tively: χ2 = 4.82, p = 0.090; χ2 = 0.717, p = 0.70; χ2 = 0.311, 
p = 0.860).
Predictions
Our experiment was designed to address a specific a priori 
question about the grasping system’s response to visual 
uncertainty. We therefore constrained our analyses to test-
ing a small number of well-specified, directional predictions, 
for specific dependent measures, rather than carrying out 
global analyses. Our hypothesis relates to grasp pre-shaping, 
and so our primary dependent measure was maximum grip 
aperture (minimum grip aperture in the case of the reverse 
probability condition). As discussed in the Introduction (and 
see Fig. 1), the margin-for-error account predicts different 
effects of increased uncertainty in normal, equal, and reverse 
tasks/probability conditions (larger, unchanged, and reduced 
grip apertures, respectively). We did not know the magni-
tude of uncertainty increase due to the blur and monocular 
manipulations, and so we could not make comparative pre-
dictions about the two conditions, beyond noting that they 
should result in qualitatively similar effects.
We prevented visual feedback in all conditions to isolate 
effects of uncertainty in estimates of object properties per 
se. For normal grasping, this manipulation itself would be 
expected to result in larger maximum grip apertures than 
under natural viewing (itself thought to be a margin-for-error 
response to loss of visual feedback; Jakobson and Goodale 
1991; Connolly and Goodale 1999; Churchill et al. 2000). 
Typically, effects of degrading vision on hand opening are 
largest at small hand openings, and reduce systematically as 
‘baseline’ hand opening increases (below the biomechanical 
upper limit on hand opening; Keefe and Watt 2009). Thus, 
predicted further increases in grip aperture (due to visual 
uncertainty) in the normal condition are likely to be most 
clear when grasping the smallest objects, where there is the 
most ‘headroom’ for grip aperture increases (see Keefe and 
Watt 2009, for a similar example). We therefore evaluated 
statistical significance in this condition using planned pair-
wise comparisons (one-tailed t tests), comparing (i) binocu-
lar viewing vs. blurred binocular, and (ii) binocular viewing 
vs. monocular for the subset of grasps to the smallest object. 
The converse pattern is expected for the reverse probabil-
ity condition. There is a limit on minimum grasp opening, 
which would be expected to have the greatest influence at the 
smallest object sizes. Thus, the effects of increased visual 
uncertainty should be most clearly seen when grasping the 
largest objects. In this condition, we therefore carried out 
planned pairwise comparisons between the same conditions 
as above, but on grasps to the largest object size. It is not 
meaningful to specify particular comparisons, a priori, for 
the equal probability condition because the prediction is for 
no effect of visual uncertainty on maximum grip apertures 
(i.e., a null result) at all object sizes. We tested these effects 
with the same statistical criterion (one-tailed probability, at 
the middle object size of 35 mm) to err on the side of find-
ing a false-positive effect of visual uncertainty (i.e., to be 
conservative with respect to accepting the null hypothesis).
Results
Data processing and computing grip aperture data
For each trial, the 3-D co-ordinates of each marker were 
low-pass filtered (Butterworth filter, 24 Hz cut-off). Grip 
aperture profiles for each trial were computed by calculating 
the Euclidean distance between the thumb and finger mark-
ers on each frame. We then identified the point of inflec-
tion in each grip aperture profile that represented the largest 
margin for error: the maximum grip aperture for the normal 
and equal probability conditions, and the minimum grip 
aperture for the reverse condition. Figure 2 shows example 
grip aperture profiles from each probability condition (under 
binocular viewing). As expected, profiles in the normal con-
dition followed the typical pattern (Jeannerod 1984, 1988), 
with a clearly identifiable maximum. In the equal condition, 
maximum grip aperture was less pronounced because grasp 
opening more closely matched the separation of the slots 
in the object for the latter part of the movement, but there 
was still a clearly identifiable maximum before contact with 
the object (Fig. 2b). In the reverse condition, grip aperture 
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profiles closely resembled inverted normal profiles, with a 
clearly identifiable minimum grip aperture.
Grip aperture scaling
A canonical property of normal grasping movements is that 
maximum grip aperture scales highly reliably with changes 
in object size. This indicates that size is encoded and used 
to programme movements that anticipate the final grasp pos-
ture required (Jeannerod 1984, 1988; Marteniuk et al. 1990). 
Sensitivity of movements to object size can be considered 
a precondition of an appropriate margin-for-error response, 
because it does not make sense that movements should be 
sensitive to the required margin for error around a given 
size if they are insensitive to size per se. The reverse-prob-
ability condition, in particular, required subjects to make a 
movement that may have been novel to them. We therefore 
considered the possibility that they may not have learned to 
scale hand opening to anticipate object size, in which case 
they would not be expected to show an appropriate margin-
for-error response to increased uncertainty. To determine 
whether this was the case, we examined the slopes of the 
functions relating each subject’s maximum grip apertures 
(minimum, for the reverse condition) to object size. We did 
this separately for each probability condition, for grasps 
made with (unblurred) binocular vision, where the scaling 
should be greatest. We characterised the degree of grip aper-
ture scaling for each subject as the slope of the best-fitting 
linear regression to their data in the relevant condition (col-
lapsed across object distance). We used all of the individual 
trials as input to the regression (rather than means), allowing 
us to calculate 99% confidence intervals around the slope 
estimates. We then evaluated whether these slopes were 
reliably different than zero—our definition of grip aperture 
scaling—by determining whether the 99% confidence inter-
vals on each slope estimate overlapped zero.
As might be expected, in the normal condition all sub-
jects showed highly significant grip aperture scaling. The 
average slope of the scaling functions (grip aperture as a 
function of object size) was 0.74 (SEM = ± 0.039), which 
is slightly higher than typical for movements made without 
visual feedback (e.g. Jakobson and Goodale 1991; Churchill 
et al. 2000). A similar pattern was evident in the equal con-
dition. All subjects again showed significant grip aperture 
scaling and the average slope of the scaling functions was 
0.78 (SEM = ± 0.058). In the reverse condition, however, 
there was no significant grip aperture scaling for four of the 
14 subjects (scaling-function slopes of 0.09, 0.10, 0.11, and 
0.17). Based on the reasoning outlined above, these subjects 
would not be expected to show an appropriate margin-for-
error adjustment to grip apertures, and so their data were not 
included in the analyses for the reverse condition (their data 
for the other two conditions were included). The remain-
ing subjects showed statistically significant grip aperture 
scaling, indicating sensitivity to object size, albeit with a 
comparatively low average scaling-function slope of 0.35 
(SEM = ± 0.040).
Effects of visual uncertainty on grip aperture
Figure 3a plots the overall average maximum grip apertures 
(n = 14) for normal grasping, as a function of object size 
(collapsed across object distance), for each viewing con-
dition. In line with the predictions of the margin-for-error 
account, and with previous data, increasing uncertainty 
either by covering one eye (monocular viewing), or blurring 




















































































Fig. 3  Grip aperture results. a Average maximum grip aperture as a 
function of object size in the normal probability condition. The sym-
bols denote the three different viewing conditions. The lines are the 
best-fitting linear regressions to the data in each case. b Average max-
imum grip aperture for the equal probability condition, in the same 
format as a. c Average minimum grip aperture in the reverse prob-
ability condition, again in the same format as a. In all plots, error bars 
denote ± 1 SEM (between subjects). Asterisks denote statistically sig-
nificant pairwise comparisons (see Table 1 for p values)
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vision, resulted in increased maximum grip apertures. As 
expected, the data show a reduced effect at large object sizes 
(Keefe and Watt 2009), but the effect of visual uncertainty is 
evident at all object sizes. As outlined in the “Predictions” 
section, we evaluated the statistical significance of these 
effects by conducting planned paired t tests (one-tailed) 
comparing grip apertures with (i) binocular vs. monocular 
vision, and (ii) binocular vs. blurred binocular vision, for 
grasps to the smallest object size (for which the effects were 
expected to be largest; Keefe and Watt 2009). The results 
of these tests are presented in Table 1. Because we tested a 
small number of planned comparisons, evaluating predic-
tions that were different for each task, we used an alpha level 
of 0.05 to determine significance (i.e., uncorrected for multi-
ple comparisons). Exact p values are reported in Table 1. For 
normal grasping, both manipulations of visual uncertainty 
caused statistically significant increases in maximum grip 
aperture. These results therefore closely resemble the typical 
effects interpreted as a margin-for-error response in previous 
reports (e.g., Jackson et al. 1997; Watt and Bradshaw 2000; 
Loftus et al. 2004; Melmoth and Grant 2006; Schlicht and 
Schrater 2007a; Keefe et al. 2011).
Figure 3b plots maximum grip apertures in the equal 
condition, in the same format as Fig. 3a. Here, the margin-
for-error account predicts no effect of visual uncertainty on 
maximum grip apertures because both wider and narrower 
hand openings increase the probability of errors similarly 
(see Fig. 1 and surrounding discussion). This is what we 
observed: maximum grip apertures were very similar in all 
three viewing conditions. T tests (for grasps to the 35 mm 
object size; see “Predictions”) showed that neither manipula-
tion of visual uncertainty had a statistically significant effect 
on grip apertures (Table 1) (note that because we had no 
predictions about the sign of any effects, we used the tail of 
the distribution that yielded the lowest p value, so as to be 
most conservative with respect to accepting the null hypoth-
esis.). Thus, in the equal condition, too, subjects’ responses 
to increased visual uncertainty were consistent with the 
margin-for-error account.
Figure 3c plots average minimum grip apertures (n = 10) 
in the reverse condition, in otherwise the same format as 
Fig.  3a, b. Here, the margin-for-error account predicts 
smaller minimum grip apertures with increasing visual 
uncertainty. Overall, the results were again consistent with 
predictions. As expected, a floor effect is evident in the data, 
with no effect of visual uncertainty at the smallest object size 
(note that in the binocular viewing condition, where visual 
uncertainty is lowest, average grip aperture when grasping 
the smallest object—the separation between markers on the 
sides of the digits—was just ~ 25 mm, which is already close 
to the physical minimum). With larger object sizes, effects 
of visual uncertainty are increasingly evident. For grasps to 
the largest object, both monocular vision and blurred vision 
resulted in significantly smaller minimum grip apertures 
(Table 1). Overall, the results for the reverse condition also 
therefore closely resemble margin-for-error adjustments to 
grip aperture in response to increased visual uncertainty, 
given a different probability landscape/task.
Grip aperture/movement speed trade‑off?
Although the pattern in our grip aperture results appears 
straightforward, caution must be exercised in interpreting 
these data in isolation. Grip apertures can be ‘traded off’ 
against movement speed, with faster movements associated 
with larger grasp opening (in itself presumably a form of 
margin-for-error response) and vice versa (Wing et al. 1986). 
Such interactions could alter the conclusions that can be 
drawn from our data. For example, in our reverse condition, 
the observed reduction in grip apertures could, in-principle, 
result from moving more slowly with increased uncertainty, 
rather than sensitivity to the (altered) probability landscape 
per se. We examined whether overall movement speed and 
grip aperture were traded off in this manner by analysing 
the effects of viewing condition on movement times within 
each probability condition. We needed to measure only the 
planned responses to increased visual uncertainty, exclud-
ing the time after object contact in which the hand is under 
haptic feedback control. We therefore characterised move-
ment time on each trial as the time elapsed between the hand 
releasing the start button and reaching 90% of the object’s 
distance, measured straight ahead along the table surface 
(here, the z-dimension). We calculated hand position by 
averaging z-position of the finger and thumb markers for 
each recorded frame. Figure 4 plots the overall mean of 
these data in each condition, collapsed across object size and 
Table 1  Statistical effects of 
increasing visual uncertainty
Asterisks denote statistically significant pairwise comparisons
T tests (one-tailed) between (i) binocular and monocular vision conditions, and (ii) binocular and blurred 
binocular vision conditions, for each probability-landscape condition
Comparison Probability-landscape condition
Normal (20 mm object) Equal (35 mm object) Reverse (100 mm object)
Binocular vs. monocular t(13) = 4.29, p < 0.001* t(13) = 1.18, p = 0.130 t(9) = 2.38, p = 0.021*
Binocular vs. blurred t(13) = 6.00, p < 0.001* t(13) = 0.11, p = 0.457 t(9) = 6.58, p < 0.001*
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distance. It can be seen that movement time was unaffected 
by visual uncertainty in all three probability-landscape con-
ditions. One-way repeated-measures ANOVAs showed that 
movement times were not significantly affected by visual 
uncertainty in either the normal (F(2,13) = 1.08; p = 0.35), 
equal (F(2,13) = 1.37; p = 0.27), or reverse (F(2,9) = 1.77; 
p = 0.20) probability-landscape conditions. On this basis, we 
conclude that it is meaningful to interpret the grip aperture 
effects at face value.
Discussion
In this experiment, we explored the intuitive idea that hand 
pre-shaping in grasping movements is programmed so as to 
actively control the probability of errors in face of (visual) 
uncertainty. We argued that such behaviour requires not only 
sensitivity to the amount of visual uncertainty (Schlicht and 
Schrater 2007a), but also knowledge of how different pos-
sible movements affect the probability of error for a given 
task—its ‘probability landscape’—if an appropriate move-
ment is to be programmed. To test this, we examined three 
different grasping tasks, each with very different probability 
landscapes, for which the appropriate responses to increased 
uncertainty were qualitatively different. The pattern of grip 
aperture changes with increased uncertainty closely matched 
the predictions for a system acting to mitigate the otherwise 
increased risk of error. Specifically, the same manipulations 
of visual uncertainty resulted in different, yet appropriate, 
grip aperture responses in the three conditions. This find-
ing demonstrates that the grasping system is sensitive to 
the probability landscape associated with different tasks, 
strengthening the evidence that grasp pre-shaping includes 
programming of a true margin-for-error component.
We used two different visual manipulations (blurring 
both eyes’ images, and removing binocular information by 
covering one eye), because we reasoned this might provide 
converging evidence about the effects of increasing vis-
ual uncertainty. This is what we found. In the normal and 
reverse conditions, both manipulations produced significant 
grip aperture changes in the predicted directions. Moreover, 
the ordering of effects was the same in the two probability 
conditions: blurring of vision produced systematically larger 
effects than removing binocular information in both cases. 
This consistency makes it likely that our effects were due to 
changes in visual uncertainty per se (with blurring causing a 
higher level of visual uncertainty than removal of binocular 
information), rather than other, uncontrolled variables. It has 
previously been suggested, for instance, that grip aperture 
changes when binocular information is removed may be 
driven by biased estimates of object size from monocular 
depth cues (Servos et al. 1992; but see; Keefe et al. 2011). 
The fact that the same uncertainty manipulations caused 
increased and decreased grip apertures (or no change), as 
appropriate to different conditions, strongly suggests that 
visual uncertainty was the underlying factor in grip aperture 
changes in our study.
Figure 3 suggests that visual uncertainty had an over-
all smaller effect on grip apertures in the reverse condition, 
compared to the normal condition. It may not be meaningful 
to directly compare these effects, given the different tasks 
and starting grip apertures. It seems likely, however, that 
the relatively unusual nature of the reverse-grasping task 
may have played a role. The normal task was essentially an 
everyday movement, and so subjects could know the prob-
ability landscape at the outset. In contrast, the reverse task 
was relatively novel, and so subjects may have been to some 
extent learning the task and associated probability landscape 
during the experiment. As discussed in the “Results”, if the 
grasping system has less knowledge of how to pre-shape the 
hand to match object size, it makes sense that this would also 
compromise the ‘additional’ step of computing a margin for 
error around that size. Similarly, poorer knowledge of the 
probability landscape per se would affect the ability to cal-
culate the margin for error appropriately. The relatively low 
scaling of minimum grip apertures with object size in the 
reverse condition (and the fact that a substantial proportion 
of our subjects showed no reliable scaling at all) is consistent 
with the task being less well learned. Thus, we speculate that 
the smaller effect of uncertainty in the reverse conditions 
was due to this relative lack of learning of the task, and asso-
ciated probability landscape, compared to normal grasping 
(see also the discussion of error rates, below), rather than a 
fundamental difference in how uncertainty was managed in 
the two conditions.
We have assumed that the goal of a margin-for-error 
mechanism is to control the probability of errors to some 
criterion level across changes in visual uncertainty. Our 


































Fig. 4  Movement time results. Average time required for the hand 
position (average of finger and thumb markers) to reach 90% of the 
target object distance in each probability condition and viewing con-
dition. Error bars denote ± 1 SEM (between subjects)
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mechanism, but do not indicate whether error rate control 
was actually achieved. We consider this here. Specifically, 
we examine whether error rates remained constant across 
changes in visual uncertainty in the normal and reverse con-
ditions, in which grip apertures could be adjusted to control 
them. No such mitigating adjustment was possible in the 
equal condition, so error rate should increase with increased 
uncertainty. Note, our experiment was not designed to pro-
vide a definitive test of this aspect of margin-for-error con-
trol, and so this analysis is necessarily speculative.
Complete failure to grasp objects was vanishingly rare 
because haptic feedback initiates secondary movements, or 
online corrections, when objects are not grasped cleanly at 
the first try (Marotta and Goodale 1998). We defined error 
rate as the percentage of trials on which such online cor-
rections occurred, defined as trials containing non-mono-
tonic bumps in grip aperture exceeding 5 mm during the 
closure phase. Figure 5 plots the overall mean percentage 
of trials containing online corrections in each condition. 
Assuming that factors affecting the criterion error level—
energetic costs of movements (Shadmehr et al. 2016), and 
precision requirements, for instance—were constant within 
each probability condition, perfect error control would 
be evident as constant error rate across changes in visual 
uncertainty. For the normal condition, error rates were 
low overall, and did not change appreciably with increased 
uncertainty. We tested for statistically significant effects 
using t tests, not corrected for multiple comparisons, to 
give the highest probability of finding departures from the 
predicted constant error rate (i.e., the highest likelihood 
of rejecting the statistical null hypothesis). Tests of both 
binocular vs. monocular viewing (t(13) = 1.34, p = 0.203) 
and binocular vs. blurred viewing (t(13) = 1.24, p = 0.237) 
were non-significant, consistent with effective control over 
error rates in normal grasping. Error rates in the reverse 
condition appear to increase somewhat with visual uncer-
tainty (Fig. 5). Using the same statistical tests as above, the 
binocular vs. monocular comparison was not significant 
(t(9) = 1.01, p = 0.338), but the binocular vs. blurred com-
parison was significant (t(9) = 2.52; p = 0.033). Although 
small, this effect is nonetheless inconsistent with perfect 
control of error rates, despite the qualitatively appropriate 
reductions in grip aperture we observed. We speculate that 
this, too, points to the task and/or probability landscape for 
this condition being learned less well than in normal grasp-
ing, compromising the calculation of an optimal margin for 
error. In the equal condition grip aperture adjustments—
larger or smaller—could not provide effective control over 
the (increased) probability of errors. Our analysis of move-
ment time (Fig. 4) indicates that our subjects did not instead 
adopt the alternative error-mitigation strategy of moving 
more slowly with increased visual uncertainty (Wing et al. 
1986) (perhaps this would not have been effective, given the 
high precision requirement of the equal task, and the fact 
that one advantage of moving more slowly is increased time 
to process visual feedback, which was unavailable here?). 
Logically, then, error rates should rise with increased uncer-
tainty, and this appears to be the case. Figure 5 suggests that 
error rates were not only substantially higher overall for the 
equal task than the other two tasks (unsurprisingly, given 
the increased precision requirement), but also increased with 
increased visual uncertainty. Using the same t test compari-
sons as previously, the binocular vs. monocular difference 
was not significant (t(13) = 1.34, p = 0.204), but the error 
rate in the blurred condition was significantly higher than 
in the binocular condition (t(13) = 2.59; p = 0.023). Overall, 
this analysis is consistent with the idea that the adjustments 
to grip apertures we observed resulted in largely effective 
control of error rates, where possible. Further studies are 
required to test this idea definitively, however.
Our study used task-dependent changes in the probabil-
ity landscape. These were relatively naturalistic, but also 
confounded changes in the probability landscape with the 
nature of the required movement. It would be informative in 
future to manipulate the probability landscape while hold-
ing the task constant (for instance in a virtual visual-haptic 
environment, where success at the task could be controlled 
independently of the actual movement produced, and prob-
ability landscapes could be specified, quantitatively, by the 
experimenter). Such an approach would allow investigation 
of whether probability landscapes (and visual uncertainty) 
are managed in a quantitatively correct manner by the 
grasping system (as opposed to the qualitative approach we 
employed), and may provide a useful window on how new 
probability landscapes are learned.
The margin-for-error idea presents a challenging problem 
for selecting the appropriate movement in a given situation, 



























Fig. 5  Online corrections to movements. Overall mean percentage of 
trials containing online corrections or secondary movements in each 
probability and viewing condition (see main text for definition). Error 
bars denote ± 1 SEM (between subjects)
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possible movements, considering the probability of error 
in each case. This problem is not specific to considering 
the probability of errors, however, but applies to movement 
selection in general, where there is a potentially bound-
less number of ways to perform a given action, but a single 
movement must ultimately be chosen and executed. Recent 
models have proposed that the specification of movements 
(determining their precise spatiotemporal parameters) and 
movement selection comprise a single process, carried out 
by a common mechanism, involving competition between 
different possible movements (e.g. Cisek 2007). We suggest 
that factoring in the probability of errors (along with other 
variables such as the value of outcomes; e.g., Christopoulos 
et al. 2015) must be an integral part of such a process.
It should also be emphasised that the idea of a margin-
for-error in grasping, as discussed here, is not tied to our 
experiment parameters of object size and visual uncertainty, 
or to particular models of grasp control. Our manipulation 
of visual uncertainty does not distinguish between uncer-
tainty about object size and position, because both proper-
ties derive from the same signal (the precision with which 
the object’s surfaces can be localised). These properties are 
dissociable, however, such as when memory for familiar 
objects provides precise size, but not location, information. 
Studies of memory-guided grasping suggest that grip aper-
tures are also adjusted in a margin-for-error-like manner in 
response to uncertainty in object position per se (Hesse et al. 
2016). Moreover, although our study is framed in terms of 
the relationship between hand opening and object size, this 
does not imply that grip aperture is necessarily an explicitly 
controlled component of grasping movements (Jeannerod 
1984, 1988). Other possibilities exist, including that grip 
apertures are merely an emergent property of a control pro-
cess that operates on the separate digits (Smeets and Bren-
ner 1999; see also; Volcic and Domini 2016). In our view, 
the concept of a margin for error applies regardless of the 
specific control mode (although implementation would dif-
fer), because the individual digits still need to approach the 
object in a way that reflects uncertainty about the position 
of its surfaces if the probability of errors is to be controlled.
The finding that the margin for error in grasping is 
configured appropriately across changes in task adds to 
the evidence that the brain not only estimates properties 
of objects to be grasped, but also encodes the amount of 
uncertainty in those estimates, and manages it appropri-
ately (Schlicht and Schrater 2007a; Christopolous and; 
Schrater 2009; Takemura et al. 2015). Theories of statisti-
cally optimal sensory integration that have emerged in the 
past 2 decades emphasise the importance of considering 
the noise/uncertainty inherent in sensory processing. Spe-
cifically, these theories specify how sensory signals would 
ideally be combined in a manner that reflects their rela-
tive informativeness in a given situation (Ernst and Banks 
2002; Ghahramani et al. 1997; Jacobs 1999; Oruç et al. 
2003). Key advantages of such a mechanism (as opposed 
to being hard-wired to rely on a particular sensory signal) 
are that object properties can be estimated robustly across 
substantial variations in signal informativeness that occur 
in natural viewing (Gepshtein and Banks 2003; Knill and 
Saunders 2003; Hillis et al. 2004; Greenwald and Knill 
2009; Keefe et al. 2011), and that it allows the brain to 
estimate object properties with the highest possible preci-
sion (least possible uncertainty) given the available infor-
mation (Yuille and Bülthoff 1996; Clark and Yuille 1990; 
Landy et al. 1995; Oruç et al. 2003; Knill and Pouget 
2004). Human perceptual performance has been shown 
to closely approximate this statistically optimal ideal in 
domains relevant to grasp control, including visual percep-
tion of surface orientation (Knill and Saunders 2003; Hillis 
et al. 2004) and visual-haptic size estimation (e.g. Ernst 
and Banks 2002; Gepshtein and Banks 2003). Yet the 
extent to which perceptual optimality confers functional 
advantages in everyday situations, or has consequences for 
conscious perception remains unclear (do we perceive dif-
ferences in perceptual uncertainty, for instance?) (Vishwa-
nath and Hibbard 2013). The benefits of optimally precise 
estimates for motor control tasks such as grasping are 
more readily apparent, however. For instance, they can be 
used to programme a smaller margin for error in grasping, 
presumably helping to minimise energetic costs associated 
with a movement, while still controlling the probability 
of success (and therefore the value associated with the 
movement outcome).
In summary, we have shown that grasp pre-shaping 
responds to increased visual uncertainty in a manner that 
closely resembles a margin for error. Specifically, we 
found that grasping is sensitive to changes in the required 
response to increased uncertainty. That is, movements 
were adjusted appropriately across substantial changes in 
the relationship between different possible movements and 
the probability of errors (the probability landscape), such 
that the same manipulations of visual uncertainty resulted 
in very different changes in grasp pre-shaping (wider, 
smaller, or unchanged hand opening), as appropriate to 
controlling the probability of errors. Our results support 
the intuitive idea that grasp programming includes a true 
margin for error, which is flexibly specified in response 
to different circumstances, exerting active control over 
the probability of errors. As such, our results also further 
underline the idea that understanding how noise/uncer-
tainty is managed is a critical aspect of understanding 
sensorimotor processing more generally.
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